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DICKSON v. REUTER'S TELEGRAPH CO.

The present seems a fit time to challenge, "To the law and to
the testimony" in bonds as well as in other things. And if the
court has justified its boast that it would "never immolate truth
and justice," it may well be doubted whether it has not "immolated
the law" in the application of its principles to these cases.
JAMES F. MISTER.
KANSAS CITY, Missouri.
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REUTER'S TELEGRAPH COM PANY.

The defendants, a telegraph company, through the negligence of their servants,
delivered to the plaintiffs a message which was not intended for them. The
plaintiffs, who reasonably supposed that the message came from their agents and
was intended for them, acted upon it and thereby incurred a loss: Held, affirming
the decision of the Common Pleas Division, that the plaintiffs could not maintain
any action against the defendants upon the ground of their negligence, or of an
implied representation by them that the message was sent by the plaintiffs' agents.

APPEAL from the judgment of the Common Pleas Division in
favor of the defendants on demurrer to the statement of claim,
which alleged that the plaintiffs were merchants at Valparaiso, and
were a branch house of the firm of' Dickson, Robinson & Co., of
Liverpool; the defendants were a telegraph company having their
chief offices in London, and agencies in Liverpool and in various
parts of the world, including South America. The defendants had
a system of forwarding in one "packed" telegram the messages of
several senders, each message being distinguished and headed by
a registered cipher known to the defendants and their agents and
also to the senders, which messages, on receipt of the packed telegrams by the defendants' agents, were transmitted to the proper
recipients. Previbus to December 1874, Dickson, Robinson & Co.
were in the habit of sending messages to the plaintiffs through the
defendants' company, and were instructed by the defendants to head
the messages by a registered cipher word indicating that the messages were intended for the plaintiffs. On the 26th of December
1874 the plaintiffs received at Valparaiso a telegraphic message,
which they understood and reasonably understood, to be a direction
from Dickson, Robinson & Co. to ship barley to England; but the
message was not in fact intended for the plaintiffs. The mis-deli-
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very wiai caused by the negligence of the defendants or their agents.
On recciving tile telegram the plaintiffs proceeded to execute the
supposed order and shipped large quantities of barley to England.

O in,, to a thll in the market for barley, the plaintiffs, by r, ason
of the shipments, sustained a serious loss, and they now claimed
that the defendants' company should reimburse them fbr that loss.
The facts are fully stated in 2 C. P. D. 62, where the 1 roceedings in the Common Pleas Division are reported.
iferschell, Q. C. (Benjamin, Q. C. and T. H. Butler with him),
for the plaintiffs.
1Watkin Williams, Q. C. (H. -D. Greene with him), for the defendants.
BItAMWELL, L. J.-I
am of opinion that this judgment must be
affirmed. The general rule of law is clear that no action is maintainable for a mere statement, although untrue, and although acted
on to the damage of the person to whom it is made, unless that
statement is false to the knowledge of the person making it. This
general rule is admitted by the plaintiffs' counsel, and prima facie
includes the present case. But then it is urged that the decision
in collen v. Wright, 7 E. & B. 301; in Ex. Ch. 8 E. & 3. 647;
has shown that there is an exception to that general rule, and
it is contended that this case comes within the principle of that
exception. I do not think that Collen v. Wrightt, properly
understood, shows that there is an exception to that general
rule. Collen v. Wright established a separate and independent
rule, which, without using language rigorously accurate, may
be thus stated: if a person requests and, by asserting that he
is clothed with the necessary authority, induces another to enter
into a negotiation with himself and a transaction with the person whose authority he represents that he has, in that case there
is a contract by him that he has the authority of the peroon with
whom he requests the other to enter into the transaction. That
seems to me to be the substance of the decision in Colhen v. WTright.
If so, it appears to me that it does not apply to the facts before us,
because in the present case I do not find any request by the defendants to the plaintiffs to do anything. The defendants are
simply the deliverers of what they say is a message from certain
persons to the plaintiffs. No contract exists : no promise is made
by the defendants, nor does any consideration move from the plain-
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tiffs. It appears to me, therefore, that there is a distinction between this case and Collen v. Wright, and consequently we cannot
have recourse to that case to take this out of the general rule to
which I have referred.
But then it is argued that this is a case of misfeasance, that is,
a case of negligence. Now the defendants' counsel made a remark
which seemed to me very just, namely, that before any person can
complain of negligence he must make out a duty to take care; and
that that duty to take care can only arise in one of two ways,
namely, either by contract or by the law imposing it. That it
does not arise by contract in this case is shown by the observations
which I have already made for the purpose of pointing out that
there is no contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants.
Does that duty arise by law? If it did arise by law, the consequence would be that the general rule which has been admitted to
exist is inaccurate, and that it ought to be laid down in these terms,
that no action will lie against a man for misrepresentation of facts
whereby damage has been occasioned to another person, unless that
misrepresentation is fraudulent or careless. But it is never laid
down that the exemption from liability for an innocent misrepresentation is taken away by carelessness. It seems to me, therefore, that that point also fails the plaintiffs.
Further, the defendants did not guarantee that the message was
authentic, and -so far as they were concerned it might not be true.
The action is not maintainable upon the ground of an implied warranty that the message was correct.
Another point raised was that the mistake was committed in the
ordinary business of the defendants. I hardly know how that was
made a separate ground of argument. Inaccuracy in a telegram is
more likely to migleid than inaccuracy in a verbal statement: and
the delivery of a telegraphic messag6 is a more formal matter than
the communication of a message by word of mouth. I cannot however see any distinction in principle between them.
It has been argued that if this action be not maintainable the
consequences will be mischievous. I am not of that opinion. If
it were held that a person is liable for a negligent misrepresenta-tion, however bona fide made, a great check would be put upon
many very useful and honest communications, owing to a fear of
being charged, and perhaps untruly charged, with negligence. I do
not think the rule upon which we are acting unreasonable either
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in itself or in its application to a telegraph company. It is to be
recollected that a telegraph company are generally under some
liability to the sender of the message, and if they are careless in
delivering it and thereby occasion damage to him, he may maintain
an action against them; and (apart from the natural desire to carry
on their business properly so as to gain customers) the existence of
this liability is a kind of security for the proper delivery of the
messages intrusted to the telegraph company.
I wish further to say that I do not see any analogy between the
liability of a common carrier and that of a telegraph company. A
carrier is liable both to the person who employs him and also to
the owner of the goods: but the plaintiffs did not employ the defendants, and they are not the owners of the message. Possibly some
analogy may exist between the present facts and a case where a
carrier has delivered goods to a person, for whom they were not
intended, and who has in consequence suffered some loss or inconvenience; but I do not tlink that under such circumstances an
action would be maintainable against the carrier; for the person to.
whom the goods were delivered might have refused to receive them,
and when he took them in he accepted the risk flowing from a possible mistake of the carrier.
In no point of view is the present action maintainable.
S

BRETT, L. J.-Upon consideration of the nature of the business.
of a telegraph company, it seems to me plain that all that they
undertake to do is to deliver a message from the person who employs them, and that they perform the part of mere messengers;
prima facie, therefore, their only contract is with the person. who.
employs them to send and deliver a message. In the present case
the plaintiffs did not send the message, and therefore the defendants have made no contract with them. The defendants have in
effect made a representation which is false in fact, but which they
did not know to be false at the time of making it. If the case for
the plaintiffs be simply that there was a misrepresentation upon
which they have reasonably acted to their detriment, it must fail,
owing to the general rule that no erroneous statement is actionable
unless it be intentionally false. This seems to be admitted by the
plaintiffs' counsel; it is urged, however, that Oollen v. Wright has
introduced an exception to that rule; but after the argument of
the defendants' counsel I have come to the conclusion that the deVOL. XXVI.-29
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cision in that case was founded upon a different and independent
rule which may be stated to be, that where a person either expressly
or by his conduct invites another to negotiate with him upon the
assertion that he is filling a certain character, and a contract is
entered into upon that footing, he is liable to an action if he does
not fill that character; but the liability arises not from the misrepresentation alone, but from the invitation to act and fiom the acting in consequence of that invitation. Therefore the decision in
Uollen v. Wright does not establish an exception to the rule that all
innocent misrepresentation does not form the ground of an action.
Now the telegraph company, being mel-e messengers, did not either
expressly or impliedly invite the plaintiffs to act with them in any
character, and the present facts do not fall within the principle of
that case.
It was further suggested that the defendants are liable by reason
of negligence; but when the argument for the plaintiffT as to negligence is examined, it is found to be based upon the doctrine,
that where a person has been led by the negligence of another to
act under the belief of a certain state of facts and in consequence
has suffered detriment, the person guilty of negligence is liable to
make good that loss; but this doctrine pr6perly applies to cases of
estoppel ; and the facts before us do not allow the plaintiffs to rely
upon the dfendants' negligence as a ground of estoppel: Swan v.
.North British Autstralasian Gaompan~y, 2 H. & C. 175.
I cannot see that any liability rests upon the defendants, and
therefore I think that the judgment of the Common Pleas Division
should be affirmed.
COTToN, L. J.-I
also am of opinion that the judgment of the
Common Pleas Division should be affirmed. The authority most
relied on by the plaintiffs' counsel was Collen v. Wright. iNow it
is quite clear that the decision in that case went upon the ground
that the testator of the defendants by his conduct impliedly
warranted that he had the authority which he professed to
have; and this is plain from the language of WILLES, J.,
in delivering the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, 8 E.
& B. 647, 657, 658. Now the principle of that case cannot
apply here. The defendants did not enter into a contract with
the plaintiffs, nor did they represent that they had any authority to
act as agents for the plaintiffs' Liverpool house: they simply deli-
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vered the message and left the plaintiffs to act or not act upon it,
as they pleased; therefore it cannot be said that in consequence
of a request by the defendants the plaintiffs undertook any liability
or were induced in any way to act upon the message. There being
no contract between the parties to the present su~t, Collen v.
Jijl, t is distinguishable.
It was further contended for the plaintiffs that the defendants
were liable by reason .of their negligence. It was admitted that
misrepresentation alone would not have supported an action; but
it was contended that, owing to the nature of the business carried
on by the defendants, they were bound to warrant the accuracy of
the message, or at least to guarantee that every precaution Jid
been taken by their agents to avoid mistake, and that the message was sent by the persons by whom it purported to be sent. I
cannot concur in this argument. A person comes into a telegraph
office and writes out a message to be forwarded by the company;
how can the company ascertain whether the person in whose name
the message is sent has really authorized its transmission ? It is
impossible to suppose that the company in the ordinary course of
their business warrant that the message comes from a particular
person; for they would thereby make a representation, the truth
of which in many cases they cannot ascertain.
Judgment affirmed.
Notwithstanding the rule in Playford's case was followed by the Court
of Common Pleas in Upper Canada, in
Feav:r v. TheaMontreal Telegraph Co.,
23 Upper Canada C. P. Rep. 150
(1873), the tendency of the American
decisions is cleirly contrary to the principle acted upon in this case. The English rule seems to be that where a tort
arises through a breach of contract, a
person injured by such tort can not
maintuin an action therefor against the
wrongdoer, unless he was a party to
the contract. It was for this reason
held that if a servant is injured on a
railway, when he himself has made the
contract for the passage, his master has
no right of action against the company
for the loss of the servant's service :
Alton v. A[dland Railway Co., 19 C.
B. N. S. 213 (1865). The duty of

carrying safely in such cases was said
to arise wholly out of the contract. The
servant alone by his contract buys the
duty, and the duty is therefore wholly
anti only due to him. It was thought
to be quite different fiom a case of pure
and simple tort to a servant, which has
no connection with a contract; there
all agree the master may sue for the
loss of service caused by the injury.
And the same rule has been applied
in America, where a widowed mother
provided medical attendance and support for her minor son, who had been
injured on a railway w-hen he travelled
on his own contract. She was not allowed to recover in an action on the
case against the company : Fairmount,
6c., RXzilway Co. v. Staler, 54 Lenna.
St. 375 (1867).
There is room to doubt whether the
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principle was properly applied inthese to B. for the same injury, this liability
cases; for in Amwv v. Union Railway does not extend to the third person and
give him a cause of action against A.,
Co., 117 Mass. 541 (1875), itwas held,
in the absence of any fraud or knownotwithstanding the foregoing decisions,
that a master could have an action of ledge of the defect: Longmeid v. Hollitort against a carrier for negligent day, 6 Exch. 761 (1851) ; see also Dainjury to his apprentice while in transitu, vidson v. Nichols, 12 Allen 514 (1866);
by which he lost his service, although Loopv. Litchfield, 42 N. Y. 351 (1870);
Losee v. Clute, 51 Id. 494 (1873).
the apprentice, in his master's absence,
The English courts do not hold,
made the contract and paid his own
notwithstanding the case of Couch v.
fare.
On the same principle as Alton's case, Steel, 3 El. & BI. 402, that wherever a
if A. delivers his horse to B., to be kept person is injured by the defendant's
and re-delivered on demand, and A. negligent breach of a public statutory
subsequently requests B. to deliver the duty, an action lies in favor of- the
horse to C., but the latter refuses so to do, party so injured. Such a result must
C. cannot maintain any action against depend upon the object and language of
B. for such refusal; not in trover, for the particular statute imposing the duty:
he does not own the horse; not in con- Atkinson v. New Castle, 4-c., Watertract, for C. was not aparty to it: Tel- works Co., 2 Ex. Div. 441 (1877).
There may be a difference in the lialit v. S'erstone, 5 M.-& W. 283 (1839) ;
bility of a telegraph company to the
MAuLE, B., using this language: "It
is clear that an action of contract can- receiver, whether the injury to him
not be maintained by a person who is arises from an act of commission or
not a party to the contract; and the of omission. If the company delivers
same principle extends to an action of him a wrong message, whereby he is
damaged, his remedy seems far more
tort arising out of a contract."
For a similar reason, ifA., by con- clear (notwithstanding the English
tract, is under a duty with B. to provide cases) than if it arise from mere nona safe carriage, and C., riding therein delivery. Such a distinction is clearly
by permission of B., is injured by a recoguised in Southcote v. Stanley, I
defect therein, he has no remedy against H. &N. 247 (1856), where the plaintiff,
A. : Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & in entering the defendant's hotel, was
W. 109 (1842). And ifA. employs injured by the falling of a piece of
S. to hang up a chandelier in his house, glass from the door he was opening, and
S. may owe a duty to A. to do his work he was held to have no right of action;
ina careful and proper manner; but if, BnxxwELL, B., saying: "My difficulty
through breach of that duty, the chan- is to see that the declaration charges any
and-injures C., the latteract of commission. If a person asked
delier falls
has no cause of action against S., who another to walk in his garden, in which
did not know of the defect, although hehad placed springguns or man traps,
the house was a public house, and C. and the guest, not being aware of it, was
lawfully therein: Collis v. Selden, Law thereby injured, that would be an act of
commission. But if a person asked anRep., 3 C. P. 495 (1868).
A., in good faith, sells toB.an article other to sleep at his house, and omitted
for a particular purpose, which, through to see that the sheets were properly
some defect therein, injures a third per- aired, whereby the visitor caught cold,
son using itby consent of B. Now,if he could maintain no action, for there
there isa contract of warranty between was no act of commission, but simply
The law of carriers
of omission."
A. and B. by which A. would be liable
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illustrates this distinction. A consignee
of goods, to whom they are sent without his order, as for a gift. or consigned
for sale, has no action against the carrier for neylcting or rehsing to receive
and transport them at the request of the
consignor, although the latter tenders
full payment for the carriage: Lafarge
v. Harris, 12 La. Ann. 553 (1858);
but there can be no doubt, that if the
carrier destroy or wilfully injure the
goods, the consignee has a right of
action for such misfeasance. Whether,
in case df sending a gift by the carrier,
the action must be brought in the name
of the donee, as stated in Angell on
491, is immaterial to our
Carriers,
present purpose. It is quite sufficient
for our argument that he can do so.
The same distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance underlies that
class of cases where a servant is injured
by a common carrier on the journey;
he has an action in his own name,
although the contract was wholly made
with his master, and the fare paid by
him. The servant could have no action
if the carrier neglected to transport him
at all, or did not transport him at the
stipulated time, but the master only ; but
for positive wrongful injury to the servant while carrying himhe has his remedy. For damages to the master's business the carrier may le liable to the
master on the contract : for damages to
the servant's body or health, he is liable
to him as for a tort: Marshall v. York,
6'c., Railway Co., I1 C. B. 655; Austin
v. Great lVestern Railway Co., Law
Rep. 2 Q. B. 442. See also Dalyell v.
Tnrer, 1 El., 131. & El. R99.
The difference between nonfeasance
and misfeasance is clearly illustrated by
the case of 1lfartin v. The Great Indian
Peninsular Railway Co., Law Rep. 3
Ex. 9 (1867). The plaintiff's goods
were being transported by the defendants under a contract with the Indian
government, to which the plaintiff'
was not a party. It was held, that

although the plaintiff could not sue on
the contract for non-performance of their
duty as carriers, he could sue for a positive injury done to his property while
in their custody under their contract to
carry safely ; and although the contract
was no concern of the plaintiff's, yet
the act was no less a wrong to him.
See also Blak-enore v. The Bristol .Exeter Railway Co., 8 El. & BI. 1034
(1858). Likewise in Langridge v. Levy,
2 At.& W. 519; 4 M.&W. 338; and
George v. Skivington, Law Rep. 5 Ex. 1,
there was a positive tort or fraud in
the contract, which was thought to enable a third person injured by it to sue,
although no partD t'o the contract itself.
So, if an apothecary administer improper medicines to his patient, or a
surgeon unskilfully treat him, and
thereby injure his health, he is liable
to the patient, although the father,
mastqr, or friend of the latter may have
been the contracting party with the
apothecary or surgeon, and was to pay
him his fees ; for even if no such contract had been made, the apothecary, if
he gave improper medicines, or the
surgeon, if he took him as a patient
and unskilfully treated him, would be
liable to an action for the misfeasance :
PAsRi E, B., in Longmeid v. Holliday, 6
Exch. 767 (1851). Yet, in such cases
the patient has no remedy (but only
the contractor) in case the apothecary
or surgeon neglects altogether to prescribe, where he has agreed to do so
upon a sufficient consideration. 'For a
breach of his contract by nonfeasance
the employer only can sue; for misfeasance in performing it, the person
injured.
A person to whom a gratuitous promise has been made by a common carrier
for his transportation, has no remedy if
the carrier declines to carry him, and
revokes his free pass, or neglects to run
the train as advertised ; but if he does
carry him, and injures him by his negligeuce, he is liable for such misfeas-
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ance; for by assuming the relation he
assumes the duty: Philadelphia, 'c.,
.Railroad Co. v. Derby, 14 How. 468;
&eamboat New World v. King, 16 How.
469; Todd v. Old Colony Railroad Co.,
3 Allen 18; Wilton v. Middlesex Railroad Co., 107 Mass. 108; Gillenwater
v. Madison Railroad Co., 5 Ind. 340.
So, if one gratuitQusly promises to do
any work, or render any service for another, but sub equently wholly neglects
to commence his undertaking, he is not
liable for such nonfeasance; but if he
commences upon the work, and by his
gross negligence injures the person or
property of the other, he then becomes
liable for such nisfeasane: Elsee v.
Gatward, 5 Term Rep. 143 ; Thorne v.
Deas, 5 Johns. 84; .Balfe v. West, 13
C. B. 466.
This distinction between nonfeasance
and misfeasance is not especially relied
upon in the American telegraph cases,
but upon inspection they all appear to
ha;re been cases of misfeasance where the
company delivered a *rong messagea message not sent; and in such cases
there is no reason why they should not
be liable as if no message at all had been
sent. And of course, if a telegraph
company deliver an order to a person
to send goods, or perform labor, and
the person incurs expense in reliance
upon such order, the company giving
the order ought to indemnify the sufferers, either because they are the principal in the affair, or if they are agents,
on the. ground of an implied warranty
that they have authorityfrom the sender
to deliver the exact message they do
deliver, as was argued in the principal
case, and of which proposition Collen v.
Wright is the main authority.
In Bowen v. Lake Erie Tehgrpl Co.,
Allen's Tel. Cas. 7, in the Court of
Common Pleas of Ohio (1833), B, &
Co., in Michigan, tent to the plaintiffs
in New York, merchants, this message:
"'Send one handsome eight-dollar blue
The message was deand orange."

livered by the defendants to the plaintiff: "Send one hundred eight-dollar
blue and orange" -a clear misfeasance; and the plaintiff sent one hundred shawls of that description, which
B. & Co. returned, and the shawl
season having closed, they were depreciated in value. The plaintiff was allowed to recover, no question being
made as to the right of action. And in
Aiken v. W1'estern Union Telegraph Co.,
5 South Car. Rep. 358 (1874), it seems
to be assumed rather ths decided. So
in Lowery v. Western Union Tdegraph
Co., 60 N. Y. 198 (1875), it was not
denied. The same may be said of
Elwood v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
45 N. Y. 549 ; Allen's Tel. Cas. 594
(1871), andRosev. U. S. Telegraph Co.,
3 Abb. P. Rep. (N. S.) 408; Allen's
Tel. Cas. 327 (1867).
N. Y. 4- Wash. Printing Tel.- Co.
v. Dryburg, 35 Penna. St. 157 (1860),
is the most important case in support
of an action by the receiver. R., in
New York, sent a message to 1).
in Philadelphia, "Send me two hand
bouquets, very handsome, one of $5
and one of $10." The word "hand"
was delivered to 1). hundred, and D.
procured a large quantity of expensive
flowers to complete the order. He was
allowed to recover of the company,
though the point of non-privity was
expressly made-a positive misfeasance. De Rutte v. New York, 4-c., Telegraph Co., 5 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
407, was also a case of misfeasance,
but there was some ground to hold that
the sender of the message in that case
was acting as agent of the receiver
(see Allen's Telegraph Cas., at p. 281),
and if so, even by the English cases
the receiver has a right of action.
If, as was held in Henkel v. Pape,
Law Rep. 6 Ex. 7 (1870), a telegraph
company is not the agent of the sender,
so as to bind him to the receiver by the
telegram as delivered, the receiver has,
according to the English law, no redress,

